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Abstract
This paper studies the welfare improvement properties of a market of al-
lowances in an economy with a single type of externality. We show that thanks
to the opening of such a market the Pareto optima can be decentralized as
marginal pricing equilibria. However, the set of equilibria is much larger than
this of Pareto optima. In order to discriminate the efficient equilibria we in-
troduce a demand revealing mechanism tailored for this framework.
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1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that the interactions between the economic ac-
tivities and the environment have effects which are not properly reflected by
the market prices. Those effects have thus been referred to as externalities.
An abundant theoretic literature has focused on the means to overcome this
failure of the market, that is to design economic models encompassing exter-
nalities whose equilibria have suitable Pareto optimality properties. A first
branch of the literature pioneered by Arrow (2), proposed the creation of ar-
tificial commodities (hereafter called Arrovian commodities) which associate
to every couple of agents and every commodity in the economy, the influ-
ence caused by the use of this commodity by the first agent on the second.
This work and its extensions by Laffont (10), Bonnisseau (3) and others can
be seen as a formalization of the Coase Theorem (see (5)) in a general equi-
librium framework. On another hand, in (4), Boyd and Conley argue that
externalities can be defined intrinsically and treated as public bads (or public
goods in case of positive externalities). They then introduce markets of al-
lowances for externalities and show that the associate Lindhal equilibria are
Pareto optimal.
Contemplating the growing interest in “pollution permits” markets such as
the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, one may assume that this
literature has influenced the governmental policies dealing with environmental
economic issues. Indeed the creation of those markets seem at first sight a
direct application of this theoretic work. However a closer look brings to light
that those markets actually do not feet in any of the models cited above.
Indeed they are markets of allowances for public bads in the sense of Boyd
and Conley, but in general the allowance is used only as a private good by the
polluters. This is underlined by the fact that the justification for the creation
of those markets is that they allow for reduction of the pollution at the least
possible cost, not that they lead to Pareto optimality. Even when consumers
have access to those markets, the free rider problem make it doubtful that a
Lindhal equilibrium may be implemented. On the opposite, our approach is to
underline the fact that when it creates an allowance market the government
also creates a public good consisting in the difference between the situation
that prevails under laissez-faire and the level of allowances it supplies to the
economy. Our aim is to determine wether this particular type of public good
provision may lead to Pareto optimal outcomes.
We focus on a general equilibrium model with a finite number of goods and
agents. The firms production causes an external effect on consumers. The
government forces by legal means the producers to use as input the quantity
of allowances corresponding to the externality they cause and initially endow
the agents with a certain quantity of allowances. Agents may then trade these
on a market. We consider various possible structure for the allowance market:
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the consumers may or may not have access to the market as buyers (i.e use
the allowance as a public good), the consumption of allowances by consumers
may be subsidized by the government.
Building upon a result of Bonnisseau (3), we show that Pareto optima can
be decentralized as marginal pricing equilibria in such an economy indepen-
dently of the market structure. Meanwhile the allowance market appears as a
complex tool allowing at the same time to define a value for the environment,
to influence the firms behavior and to implement wealth transfers.
However the analogous of the first welfare Theorem does not hold, that is
marginal pricing equilibria are not necessarily Pareto optimal. In particular
when the consumers have access to the allowance market as buyers, a necessary
condition for an equilibrium to be Pareto optimal is paradoxically that no
allowance is purchased by the consumers (as in Smith and al. (11)). Hence, the
only way to obtain a Pareto optimal outcome is that the government chooses
a proper initial allocation. In this respect, we provide a simple mechanism
to implement optimality: the government diminishes its supply of allowances
proportionally to the consumers purchase.
2 The Model
We consider an economy with a finite number L of commodities labeled by
ℓ = 1 · · ·L, lying within an environment which is characterized by a real
parameter τ.
There are n firms in the economy indexed by j = 1 · · ·n whose production
possibilities are described by a closed set Yj. As they produce, firms influence
the environment. We measure according to the differentiable function fj :
R
L → R− the damage caused to the environment by firm j. The actual state
of the environment when the firms choose a production scheme (yj) ∈
∏n
j=1 Yj
is
∑n
j=1 fj(yj).
There are m consumers in the economy indexed by i = 1 · · ·m. They gain
utility from the consumption of strictly positive quantities of commodities 1
to L and are sensitive to the state of the environment. Their preferences are
represented by a quasi-concave and differentiable utility function ui defined
on RL++ × R which associates to a bundle of commodities xi ∈ R
L
++ and to
an environmental parameter τ ∈ R− an utility level ui(xi, τ). We shall denote
by Pi(xi, τ) the set of elements {(x
′
i, τ
′) ∈ RL++ × R− | ui(x
′
i, τ
′) ≥ ui(xi, τ)}
corresponding to the pair of commodity bundle and state of the environment
preferred to (xi, τ) by agent i. We shall assume in the remaining of the paper
that the utility functions are monotone, locally non-satiated in commodities,
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increasing with the environment, and that one of them is strictly monotone 3 .
This will ensure in particular equilibrium prices are positive.
The initial resources of the economy are set equal to ω ∈ RL++.
The remaining of this paper is concerned with the Pareto optimal outcomes
of this economy defined as:
Definition 1 An element ((xi), (yj) ∈ (R
L
++)
m ×
∏n
j=1 Yj is an attainable al-
location if
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj + ω.
An element ((xi), (yj)) ∈ (R
L
++)
m ×
∏n
j=1 Yj is a Pareto optimum if it is an
attainable allocation and if there exist no attainable allocation ((x′i), (y
′
j)) such
that for all i, ui(x
′
i,
∑n
j=1 fj(y
′
j)) ≥ ui(xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)), and for at least an i0,
ui0(x
′
i0
,
∑n
j=1 fj(y
′
j)) > ui0(xi0 ,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)).
A result of Bonnisseau (3) entails a general characterization of these Pareto
optima:
Theorem 1 (Theorem 3 in Bonnisseau (3)) If ((xi), (yj)) is a Pareto op-
timum of E, then there exist (p, q) ∈ RL+1+ such that
(1) For all i, there exist qi such that (p, qi) ∈ NPi(xi,
∑n
j=1
fj(yj))
(xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj))
and
∑m
i=1 qi = q
(2) For all j, p+ q∇fj(yj) ∈ NYj(yj)
Building on this result, which extends the optimality properties of marginal
pricing (see Guesnerie (7)) to a framework encompassing externalities, we
focus on the possibility to decentralize Pareto optima as marginal pricing
equilibria for appropriate market structures. Let us recall that marginal pricing
equilibria coincide with the standard competitive equilibria under additional
convexity assumptions but also allows to deal with increasing returns to scale
in the production sector.
Now, when there exist markets for standard commodities only, a price equi-
librium with marginal tarification of the economy may be defined as:
Definition 2 An allocation (xi), (yj)) in (R
L
++)
m×
∏n
j=1 Yj is a marginal pric-
ing equilibrium with transfers if there exist a price p ∈ RL+ and a wealth allo-
cation (w1, · · · , wm) ∈ R
m with
∑m
i=1 wi = p · (ω +
∑n
j=1 yj) such that:
(1) For every i, xi maximizes ui(·,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) among the feasible consump-
tion plans {xi ∈ R
L
++ | p · xi ≤ wi};
(2) For all j, p ∈ NYj(yj);
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi;
3 So that one can apply Theorem 3 of Bonnisseau (3).
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and it is well-known 4 that, when there are non-trivial environmental effects
none of these equilibria is Pareto optimal. Indeed, at such an equilibrium the
negative external effects of production on the environment are not reflected
by the market prices.
3 Markets of allowances
A solution to this failure of standard markets is given by the Coase Theorem.
It advocates the opening of allowance markets on which consumers sells to
producers the right to deteriorate the environment against some financial com-
pensation. However the first tentative implementations of the Coase Theorem
in a general equilibrium framework by Arrow (2) and Laffont (10) requested
the opening of one allowance market per commodity and per couple of agents.
On those markets agent i and j were supposed to trade the influence on agent
j of the use of the good l by agent i. As those authors themselves acknowledge,
such a setting is far from realistic. In practice, in the US SO2 market or in
the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, a single market of allowances
has been opened whose functioning can be summarized as follows.
Firms are forced by legal means to use as input in their production process a
quantity of allowances corresponding to their actual influence on the environ-
ment. Namely, in order to produce yj, firm j should use as input a quantity
fj(yj) of allowances. Meanwhile the government supplies allowances to the
economy by initially allocating a quantity A among consumers and producers.
This leads to the opening of an allowance market on which firms may purchase
from the other agents the quantity of allowances they need to set in motion
their production plans.
This type of market, where the allowance bears on an externality whose essence
is well defined, has been studied by Boyd and al. in (4) and Conley and al.
in (6). These authors treat allowances symmetrically to public good and use
Lindhal-like personalized prices in order to obtain decentralization results.
Focusing on the symmetry with public goods, it seems to us these authors do
not take in consideration an important particularity of the allowance market:
by fixing the endowment in allowances the government freely supplies a public
good to consumers: the difference between this endowment and the situation
that prevails under laissez-faire. This particular way of providing public goods
partly relax the free-riding problems. Hence, one may obtain decentralization
results for simple market mechanisms, and it is not necessary to introduce
personalized prices.
4 What one can also check by comparing the first order necessary conditions for
equilibria with the characterization of Pareto optima given in Lemma 1.
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4 Private Equilibria
Indeed, let us consider the simplest situation where the allowance is exchanged
only as a private good among producers. The associated equilibrium concept
is:
Definition 3 An allocation ((xi), (yj, fj(yj))) in (R
L
++)
m×
∏n
j=1(Yj×R−) is a
marginal pricing equilibrium with transfers and private use of the allowance 5
if there exist a price (p, q) ∈ RL+1+ and a wealth allocation (w1, · · · , wm) ∈ R
m
with
∑m
i=1 wi = p · (ω +
∑n
j=1 yj) such that:
(1) For every i, xi maximizes ui(·,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) in the budget set {xi ∈ R
L
++ |
p · xi ≤ wi};
(2) For all j, p+ q∇fj(yj) ∈ NYj(yj);
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj + ω;
(4)
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) + A = 0.
Using the characterization of Pareto optima in Lemma 1, it appears clearly
that:
Proposition 1 For every Pareto optimum, there exist an initial allocation
of allowances which allows to decentralize it as a private marginal pricing
equilibrium with transfers.
Proof: Given the quasi-concavity of the utility function, a sufficient condi-
tion for an xi satisfying the budget constraint to solve the consumer problem
at a private marginal pricing equilibrium is that there exist qi ∈ R such that
(qi, p) ∈ NPi(xi,
∑n
j=1
fj(yj))
(xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)). This condition as well as (2) and
(3) are clearly satisfied at a Pareto optimum according to Theorem 1. Hence
given a Pareto optimum, it suffices to choose a wealth allocation letting each
consumption plan satisfying the budget constraint and an initial allocation of
allowances equal to the firms demand, in order to decentralize it as a marginal
pricing equilibrium with transfers and private use of the allowance. 
Hence whenever the environment acquires (through the allowance market) a
value, Pareto optima may be decentralized as marginal pricing equilibria. Nev-
ertheless there remains a huge indeterminacy on the allocations of allowances
which entail Pareto optimality. A priori the probability to reach a Pareto
optima is rather small, so to say, negligible: when the set of equilibria is a
non-empty differentiable manifold, the optimality condition
∑m
i=1 qi = q im-
plies the set of Pareto optimal equilibria is a submanifold of codimension 1.
To overcome this indeterminacy, we shall study refined notions of equilibria.
5 which we will refer to as private marginal pricing equilibrium for short.
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5 Public Equilibria
First, let us determine to which extent the opening of the allowance market
to public use by the consumers can diminish the number of non-optimal equi-
libria. When the allowance market is opened to consumers they may purchase
it as a public good in order to improve the state of the environment and their
program is turned to maximize, given the other agents purchase of allowances
(sk)k 6=i, the utility ui(xi,−A+Σk 6=isk+si) they get from the consumption bun-
dle (xi, si) ∈ R
L
++ × R+ of regular commodities and allowances. Accordingly
the equilibrium concept is turned to:
Definition 4 An allocation (xi, si), (yj, fj(yj))) in (R
L
++×R+)
m×
∏n
j=1(Yj ×
R−) is a public marginal pricing equilibrium with transfers
6 if there exist a
price (p, q) ∈ RL+1+ and a wealth allocation (w1, · · · , wm) ∈ R
m with
∑m
i=1 wi =
(p, q) · (ω +
∑n
j=1 yj, A+
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) such that:
(1) For every i, (xi, si) maximizes ui(xi,−A+
∑
k 6=i sk+si) among the feasible
consumption plans {(xi, si) ∈ R
L
++ × R+ | p · xi + qsi ≤ wi} ;
(2) For all j, p+ q∇fj(yj) ∈ NYj(yj);
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj + ω;
(4)
∑m
i=1 si =
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) + A.
At such a public equilibrium, the first-order conditions for the consumers
program are given by the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 Let xi ∈ R
L
++ :
• The bundle (xi, si) with si > 0 solves the consumer problem if and only if
(p, q) · (xi, si) = wi and (p, q) ∈ NPi(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1
si)
(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1 si).
• The bundle (xi, 0) solves consumer i program if and only if p · xi = wi and
there exist qi ≤ q such that (p, qi) ∈ NPi(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1
si)
(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1 si).
Proof: Given the quasi-concavity of the utility function, first-order condi-
tions are necessary and sufficient. Moreover, non-satiation implies the bud-
getary constraint is necessarily binding.
Now at a bundle (xi, si) ∈ R
L+1
++ , no other constraint than the budgetary one
may be binding so that the bundle is optimal if and only if (p, q) · (xi, si) = wi
and (p, q) ∈ NPi(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1
si)
(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1 si).
At a bundle (xi, 0) the constraint si ≥ 0 is binding so that it is sufficient and
necessary for optimality that p · xi = wi and that there exist µi ≥ 0 such that
(p, q) ∈ NPi(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1
si)
(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1 si) + µi(0, 1).
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in extenso: marginal pricing equilibrium with transfers and public use of the
allowances
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The proof then proceeds easily.
This characterization yields that every Pareto optimum can be decentralized
as a public equilibrium:
Proposition 2 For every Pareto optimum, there exist an initial allocation of
allowances which allows to decentralize it as a public marginal pricing equilib-
rium with transfers.
Proof: Let (xi), (yj) be a Pareto optimal allocation. According to Proposition
1 there exist a price (p, q) and a wealth distribution (wi) such that it can be
decentralized as a private equilibrium. In order to show, that it may also be
decentralized as a public equilibrium, it suffices to show that (xi, 0) solves the
consumer program at a public equilibrium.
Now, from the proof of Proposition 1 one knows that there exist qi ∈ R such
that (p, qi) ∈ NPi(
∑n
j=1
fj(yj),xi)
(xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)). Using monotonicity of the util-
ity functions, one in fact has qi ≥ 0 for all i. Using Pareto optimality of the
equilibrium, one has
∑m
i=1 qi = q, and hence qi ≤ q. Hence for all i there exist
qi := qi ≤ q such that (p, qi) ∈ NPi(xi,
∑n
j=1
fj(yj))
(xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)). Using clear-
ance of the allowance market, and the fact that p ·xi = wi, sufficient condition
for (xi, 0) to solve the consumers program are satisfied according to Lemma 1.
The proof then proceeds as for Proposition 1. 
Moreover, Lemma 1 also provides a testable necessary condition for optimality.
This condition already underlined by Smith and al. in (11) is that at an
optimum, consumers are priced out of the allowance market. Indeed at an
optimum the allowance price must be equal to the sum of marginal utilities
for the environment and hence greater than each of these marginal utilities
taken individually. For the consumer, such a situation is acceptable only if he
has no allowances left to sale. In other words, a public equilibrium is Pareto
optimal only if none of the consumers actually purchase allowances. Namely,
one has
Proposition 3 A public marginal pricing equilibrium (xi, si), (yj, fj(yj))) is
Pareto optimal only if for all i, si = 0.
Proof: Let (xi, si), (yj, fj(yj))) be a public marginal pricing equilibrium and
(p, q) the corresponding equilibrium price. Let us assume that one of the si
is positive. It implies according to Lemma 1 that (p, q) ∈ NPi(xi,
∑n
j=1
fj(yj))
(xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)). Now, the regularity of the utility functions imply that NPi(xi,
∑n
j=1
fj(yj))
(xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) is a half line whenever (xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) ∈ R
L
++×R.
In other words, given p, for all i there exist a single qi, such that (p, qi) ∈
NPi(xi,
∑n
j=1
fj(yj))
(xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)). The strict monotonicity of the utility func-
tions with regards to the environment imply that all those qi are positive. Ac-
cording to the preceding, one of those is equal to q. Therefore, one necessarily
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has
∑m
i=1 qi > q and the equilibrium can not be Pareto optimal. 
Paradoxically, the interest of opening the allowance market to consumers is to
detect they do not participate in it.
On another hand, the set of public equilibria is a better approximation of the
set of Pareto optima than the set of private equilibria as there are less public
than private equilibria. Indeed while one can associate to every public equi-
librium a private equilibrium by subtracting to every consumer endowment
in allowances the amount it purchases at equilibrium, one can associate to
a private equilibrium a public one only if at this private equilibrium every
consumer marginal utility for the environment is lower than the allowance
price.
To sum up, the opening of the allowance market to the consumers withdraw
part of the indeterminacy on the optimality properties of the equilibria and
provides a testable necessary condition for optimality, that consumers are
priced out of the allowance market.
6 Subsidized Equilibria
Pursuing in the direction of refinement through public use of the allowance,
let us now consider situations where the government amplifies the consumers
demand in allowances by diminishing proportionally to the consumers pur-
chase the level of allowances it supplies to the economy. Namely one considers
(ki)-amplified
7 equilibria at which the government announces a diminution
of (ki − 1)si of its supply of allowances whenever consumer i purchases si
allowances. Therefore each consumer considers that when it purchases si al-
lowances, the state of the environment is improved of kisi.
However, consumers may anticipate that the amplification of their purchases
by the government leads to a diminution of their own initial endowment in
allowances and hence of their wealth. Taking this fact in consideration they
may strategically reduce their purchase of allowances. Such a failure may be
easily overcame. It suffices that the government announces it will amplify one
agent purchase by diminishing only the other agents initial endowments. Such
a mechanism can be related to the matching process described by Guttman
in (9).
One can then define a (ki)-amplified equilibrium as:
Definition 5 An allocation (xi, si), (yj, fj(yj))) in (R
L
++×R+)
m×
∏n
j=1(Yj ×
7 In the following ki > 1
9
R−) is a (ki)-amplified public marginal pricing equilibrium with transfers
8 if
there exist a price (p, q) ∈ RL+1+ and a wealth allocation (w1, · · · , wm) ∈ R
m
with
∑m
i=1 wi = (p, q) · (ω +
∑n
j=1 yj, A −
∑m
i=1(ki − 1)si +
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) such
that:
(1) For every i, (xi, si) maximizes ui(xi,−A +
∑
h 6=i khsh + kisi) among the
feasible consumption plans {(xi, si) ∈ R+ × R
L
++ | qsi + p · xi ≤ wi};
(2) For all j,p+ q∇fj(yj) ∈ NYj(yj);
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj + ω;
(4)
∑m
i=1 si =
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) + A−
∑m
i=1(ki − 1)si;
At a (ki)-equilibrium, the first-order conditions for the consumers program are
given by the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 Let xi ∈ R
L
++ :
• The bundle (xi, si) with si > 0 solves the consumer problem if and only if
(p, q) · (xi, si) = wi and (p,
q
ki
) ∈ NPi(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1
kisi)
(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1 kisi).
• The bundle (xi, 0) solves consumer i program if and only if p · xi = wi and
there exist qi ≤ q such that (p,
qi
ki
) ∈ NPi(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1
kisi)
(xi,−A+
∑m
i=1 kisi).
Proof: The proof is similar to this of Proposition 1 but for the 1
ki
coefficient
whose presence is due to the amplification of the consumers purchases.
This characterization yields that every Pareto optimum at which consumer i
marginal utility for the environment 9 , qi, is lower than
q
ki
can be decentralized
as a public equilibrium:
Proposition 4 For every Pareto optimum at which consumer i marginal
disutility , qi, is lower than
q
ki
, there exist an initial allocation of allowances
which allows to decentralize it as a (ki)-amplified equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is similar to this of Proposition 2 : one considers the cor-
responding private equilibrium and show that the necessary conditions for the
consumers program given by Lemma 2 are satisfied when each consumer actu-
ally purchase 0 allowances.
While
∑m
i=1
1
ki
is greater than 1, one has a testable condition for optimality
analogous to this given by Proposition 3, an amplified equilibrium is optimal
only if at least one consumer is priced out of the allowance market:
Proposition 5 Let (ki) such that
∑m
i=1
1
ki
> 1, a (ki)-equilibrium (xi, si), (yj,
fj(yj)) is Pareto optimal only if there exist i such that si = 0.
8
in extenso: a marginal pricing equilibrium with transfers and k times amplification
of the public use of allowances
9 Here qi and q are the elements given by Theorem 1.
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Proof: The proof is similar to this of Proposition 3.
Remark 1 In fact, the preceding can be strengthen to: if I1 is a subset of
consumers such that
∑
i∈I1
1
ki
> 1, it can not be that every agent in I1 purchases
a positive level of allowances.
According to Lemma 2, as
∑m
i=1
1
ki
decreases towards 1, the constraint bearing
on the consumers allowances choices become tighter and tighter (as every agent
marginal utility must be at least ki times smaller than the allowance price).
There are fewer and fewer equilibria and consequently the set of equilibria
surround more and more closely the set of Pareto optima.
When
∑m
i=1
1
ki
reaches 1, the (ki)-amplified equilibria finally satisfy sufficient
conditions for optimality in the sense of:
Proposition 6 Let (ki) such that
∑m
i=1
1
ki
= 1. At a (ki)-amplified equilibrium
(xi, si), (yj, fj(yj)) such that for all i, si > 0, the necessary conditions of The-
orem 1 hold. If moreover, the production sets and the environmental damages
functions are convex, such an equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
Proof: Indeed according to Lemma 2, at such an equilibrium one has (p, q
ki
) ∈
NPi(xi,
∑n
j=1
fj(yj))
(xi,
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)). Together with the other equilibrium condi-
tions, it implies the necessary conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. As those
conditions are sufficient for optimality under the additional convexity assump-
tions on the production, the proof is complete.
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